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ECONOMY
Expectations that the goverment could
apply a quick-fix solution to economic woes and bring back
the boom times have given way to reality.
Although Premier Thaksin has moved quickly to introduce key
policies, the court case against him for alleged non-disclousure
of assets continnues to create uncertainty about the future
of his adminstration
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The image of Thaksin Shinawatra as a white knight leading
the new government and the country to new-found prosperity slowly
faded in the first half of the year, replaced with the growing realisation
that the country's fundamental woes would take years, if not decades,
to overcome.
Although the government's policies are highly controversial, even
the biggest critics concede that strong progress has been made in
translating Thai Rak Thai's ambitious campaign promises into action.
With exports stalling because of the slowdown in the
United States and Japanese markets, and private investment and demand
flat, Mr Thaksin and his finance minister, Somkid Jatusripitak,
have discarded the market-Ied approach taken by the previous government
in favour of strong state-Ied solutions.
One of the biggest of these is the Thai Asset Management
Corp, a debt workout agency, details of which were fleshed out in
February in the first of the government's high-profile workshops
among policymakers, civil servants and private-sector leaders.
The TAMC, which is set to begin operations in July, will take over
1.3 trillion baht in bad loans from local banks, the theory being
that pooling creditor claims can expedite corporate debt restructuring
and industrial reform.
Workshops on the equities market, tourism, illegal drugs and small
and medium-sized enterprises soon folIowed, although with mixed
results.
Another discernible change in policy and style brought about under
the Thaksin government has been the attitude toward international
institutions. While maintaining that ThaiIand's borders remain open
to foreign investment, tourists and goods, there is little question
that the government will focus on protecting Thai firms first.
The mindset extends to delaying previous plans for market liberalisation,
thus shielding local firms longer from the pressures of global competition.
The common refrain taken by ministers is that international standards
and norms cannot be adopted wholesale, but must be "tailored" and
"structured" relative to domestic business practices, social norms
and the overall economic environment.
On the fiscal side, complementing the government's high-profile
programmes such as village investment funds and debt suspension
for farmers, are standard measures to improve the budget process,
speed up allocation of funds and rationalise new state spending
programmes.
Monetary policy, which since 1998 had been kept loose to spur economic
growth and corporate debt restructuring, was abruptly reversed by
the government in May.
M.R. Chatumongol Sonakul, the well-respected but outspoken governor
of the Bank of Thailand, was sacked after a week-long public debate
between the central bank and the government over interest rates.
The central bank had insisted that with inflationary pressures
non-existent, interest rates should continue to be maintained low
to help boost growth, a stance favoured by many analysts and economists.
But the government insisted that deposit rates of 2-2.5% were encouraging
companies to refinance their foreign debt, leading to capital outflows
and putting pressure on the baht.
Low interest rates had done little to revive the economy, government
economists argued, while the fall in
deposit revenue was hurting consumption.
Under the new central bank governor, M.R. Pridiyathorn Devakula,
the key 14- day repurchase rate was increased in June, the first
rise in at least 13 months and aimed at righting "distortions" in
the money market.
M.R. Pridiyathorn, a long-time banker and former president of the
Exim Bank, said monetary policy would be changed to focus on stabilising
the exchange rate and foreign reserves, a different approach from
the policy under M.R. Chatumongol, which made controlling inflation
the prime goal of the central bank.
At the same time, the government also took steps to break the "liquidity
trap" within the financial system through an expanded role for state
banks.
Outstanding bank loans continued to contract throughout the first
half of the year due to low loan growth, write-offs of bad loans
and deleveraging or refinancing by top companies.
With credit risks rising in the weak economy, banks themselves
had taken a more cautious line on lending to small and medium-sized
companies, while top firms increasingly turned directly to the bond
market to take advantage of lower funding costs.
The result was that liquidity continued to pool in the money market,
with the excess estimated as high as 600 billion baht from the inability
or unwillingness of banks to lend.
State
banks such as Krung Thai Bank were directed to accelerate lending
plans. The central bank also signalled that it would re-evaluate
bank regulations, with an eye on removing costs for commercial banks
which, in turn, would presumably allow them to boost lending at
lower interest rates.
A new People's Bank, operated through the Government Savings Bank,
was launched in June as a micro-credit programme to help finance
new business startups and rural entrepreneurs.
The Small Industry Finance Corp was "upgraded" to the status of
a commercial bank dedicated to small and medium-sized businesses,
while the Small Industry Credit Guarantee Corporation gained increased
resources to support lending by other state financial institutions.
Yet all of the measures announced by the government in the first
half did not come soon enough to ease pressures from abroad.
Export value in US dollars for the first quarter was $20.7 billion,
a drop of 2.7% from tle same period the year before and making the
Commerce Ministry's official growth target of 9.4% for 2001 seemingly
impossible to reach.
Higher global oil prices led to an import bill of $20.8 billion
in the first quarter, 9.5% higher than the same period the year
before and leading an overall trade deficit of $100 million for
the quarter.
Political uncertainties surrounding the fate of Prime Minister
Thaksin and his ongoing case before the Constitutional Court also
played a role in muting investor confidence in the first half of
this year.
Thai Rak Thai's seemingly unshakable dominance in Parliament could
be thrown into jeopardy if the court was to uphold charges by the
National Counter Corruption Commission that Mr Thaksin violated
asset disclosure laws while serving as a deputy prime minister four
years earlier.
A guilty verdict would lead to a five-year ban from political office
and immediate concerns about whether the three-year-old Thai Rak
Thai Party would be able to continue if its leader and founder was
removed from the limelight.
The various pressures on the economy led the Bank of Thailand to
announce in April that it was cutting its growth forecast for 2001
to 2.5-4%, from 3-4.5% earlier. But economists were cautiously optimistic
that increased fiscal spending, coupled with gains in the economies
of major trading partners, would lead to higher growth in the second
half of the year and 5% growth for 2002.
Author: Cholada Ingsrisawang
Source: Bangkok Post
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